The Iranian-made Shahed 131 and 136 one-way attack unmanned aerial systems (UAS), which Russia now produces domestically under license as Geran 1 and 2, respectively, have been key protagonists of Moscow’s offensive campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. They have also posed a threat in the airspace of many Middle Eastern countries, from Saudi Arabia to the United Arab Emirates to Israel, in recent years.
Several of them were used in the Iranian-orchestrated September 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco’s oil terminals in Khurais and Abqaiq, which temporarily knocked out 5% of the world’s oil supply. Shahed-136 drones are also among the Houthis’ weapons of choice for attacking commercial vessels passing through the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, wreaking havoc on global maritime trade and connectivity.
Their effectiveness in the Ukrainian theater, however, appears to be on a downward trend. In recent months, Ukraine has been improving its counter-drone and low-tier air defense capabilities by expanding its early-warning network of fixed, distributed radar, electro-optical, and acoustic sensors. The military has also been training new “mobile fire groups” specialized in hunting down Shahed and other one-way attack drones, the vast majority of which are shot down.
Aggregated data collected by this author, based on official figures from the Ukrainian Air Force, shows that the interception rate of Shahed UAS has been steadily increasing over the past five months, averaging 91% since March 2024.
For comparison, the average Shahed interception rate over the previous 6 months was 80%, with the highest figure of 83% in November of last year. Ukraine’s growing success against the Shaheds stems from a combination of widespread multi-spectrum sensor coverage and effective tactics, techniques, and procedures. In terms of hardware, Ukrainian forces have deployed a mix of mobile counter-UAS and short-range combined electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, anti-aircraft guns such as the ZU-23-2 and the German-made Gepard, shoulder-fired air defense systems such as the Stinger and Igla, and cost-effective laser-guided missiles such as the US-supplied Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS).
These operations may also involve the use of medium-range air defences and tactical aircraft. This requires smooth coordination between ground-based fire teams, brigade command posts and air headquarters to deconflict and prevent friendly fire incidents.
Overall, the declining effectiveness of the Shaheds is commensurate with the improvement in Ukraine’s C-UAS and short-range air defense (SHORAD) capabilities and demystifies the over-hyped operational impact of the drone often promoted in mainstream discourse. In fact, sufficiently dense, layered countermeasures – and the requisite trained personnel – are perfectly capable of dealing with the Shahed and other one-way attack UAS, to the disappointment of “game-changer” theorists and drone-fetishist commentators.
Far from being secretive or expensive, these countermeasures must complement direct attacks on enemy drone teams and infrastructure. They must include cost-effective solutions such as airburst anti-aircraft guns, MANPADS, and low-level guided interceptors such as BAE Systems’ APKWS 70mm laser-guided rocket and Raytheon’s Coyote Block II+ missiles.
Defensive solutions to the threat of Shahed and other one-way attack drones already exist and should be scaled up by NATO allies without hesitation. The only question is whether governments and planners across the alliance decide to invest in scalable, low-cost interceptors and short-range air defense capabilities amid many other defense priorities.
Nevertheless, while the effectiveness of Shaheds is diminishing, it would be a mistake to underestimate the threat posed by these and other one-way attack drones. As seen in Ukraine and elsewhere, these systems can be used to reveal the positions of air defenses, deplete air defense interceptor stocks, and drain resources that could be used elsewhere, while even a few systems (e.g., 2-3%) that succeed in reaching their target can cause serious destruction, particularly against critical infrastructure. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the drones increases dramatically when used as part of saturation attacks with long-range missiles.
However, this problem is by no means insoluble and should be high on the defence agenda of NATO countries.
Federico Borsari is a resident fellow at the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), where he also leads the Defense Technology Initiative.
